rfc9852.original   rfc9852.txt 
Using TLS in Applications R. Salz Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Salz
Internet-Draft Akamai Technologies Request for Comments: 9852 Akamai Technologies
Updates: 9325 (if approved) N. Aviram BCP: 195 N. Aviram
Intended status: Best Current Practice 14 April 2025 Updates: 9325 January 2026
Expires: 16 October 2025 Category: Best Current Practice
ISSN: 2070-1721
New Protocols Using TLS Must Require TLS 1.3 New Protocols Using TLS Must Require TLS 1.3
draft-ietf-uta-require-tls13-12
Abstract Abstract
TLS 1.3 use is widespread, it has had comprehensive security proofs, TLS 1.3 is widely used, has had comprehensive security proofs, and
and it improves both security and privacy over TLS 1.2. Therefore, improves both security and privacy deficiencies in TLS 1.2.
new protocols that use TLS must require TLS 1.3. As DTLS 1.3 is not Therefore, new protocols that use TLS must require TLS 1.3. As DTLS
widely available or deployed, this prescription does not pertain to 1.3 is not widely available or deployed, this prescription does not
DTLS (in any DTLS version); it pertains to TLS only. pertain to DTLS (in any DTLS version); it pertains to TLS only.
This document updates RFC9325 and discusses post-quantum cryptography
and the security and privacy improvements over TLS 1.2 as a rationale
for that update.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-uta-require-tls13/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Using TLS in
Applications Working Group mailing list (mailto:uta@ietf.org), which
is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/uta/.
Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/uta/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at This document updates RFC 9325. It discusses post-quantum
https://github.com/richsalz/draft-use-tls13. cryptography and the security and privacy improvements in TLS 1.3 as
the rationale for the update.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 October 2025. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9852.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights publication of this document. Please review these documents
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions
3. Implications for post-quantum cryptography (PQC) . . . . . . 3 3. Implications for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)
4. TLS Use by Other Protocols and Applications . . . . . . . . . 3 4. TLS Use by Other Protocols and Applications
5. Changes to RFC 9325 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Changes to RFC 9325
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. Security Considerations
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7. IANA Considerations
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8. References
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8.1. Normative References
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8.2. Informative References
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document specifies that, since TLS 1.3 use is widespread, new This document specifies that new protocols that use TLS must assume
protocols that use TLS must require and assume its existence. It that TLS 1.3 is available and require its use. As DTLS 1.3 is not
updates [RFC9325] as described in Section 5. As DTLS 1.3 is not
widely available or deployed, this prescription does not pertain to widely available or deployed, this prescription does not pertain to
DTLS (in any DTLS version); it pertains to TLS only. DTLS (in any DTLS version); it pertains to TLS only.
TLS 1.3 [TLS13] is in widespread use and fixes most known TLS 1.3 [TLS13] is in widespread use and fixes most known
deficiencies with TLS 1.2. Examples of this include encrypting more deficiencies with TLS 1.2. Examples of this include encrypting more
of the traffic so that it is not readable by outsiders and removing of the traffic so that it is not readable by outsiders and removing
most cryptographic primitives now considered weak. Importantly, the most cryptographic primitives now considered weak. Importantly, the
protocol has had comprehensive security proofs and should provide protocol has had comprehensive security proofs and should provide
excellent security without any additional configuration. excellent security without any additional configuration.
TLS 1.2 [TLS12] is in use and can be configured such that it provides TLS 1.2 [TLS12] is in use and can be configured such that it provides
good security properties. However, TLS 1.2 suffers from several good security properties. However, TLS 1.2 suffers from several
deficiencies, as described in Section 6. Addressing them usually deficiencies, as described in Section 6. Addressing them usually
requires bespoke configuration. requires bespoke configuration.
This document updates RFC9325 and discusses post-quantum cryptography This document updates [RFC9325]. It discusses post-quantum
and fixed weaknesses in TLS 1.2 as a rationale for that update. cryptography and the security and privacy improvements in TLS 1.3 as
the rationale for the update. See Section 5.
2. Conventions and Definitions 2. Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
3. Implications for post-quantum cryptography (PQC) 3. Implications for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)
Cryptographically-relevant quantum computers (CRQC), once available, Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQCs), once available,
will have a huge impact on TLS traffic (see, e.g., Section 2 of will have a huge impact on TLS traffic (see, e.g., Section 2 of
[I-D.ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers]). To mitigate this, TLS applications [PQC-FOR-ENGINEERS]). To mitigate this, TLS applications will need
will need to migrate to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) [PQC]. to migrate to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) [PQC]. Detailed
Detailed considerations of when an application requires PQC or when a considerations of when an application requires PQC or when a CRQC is
CRQC is a threat that an application need to protect against, are a threat that an application needs to protect against are beyond the
beyond the scope of this document. scope of this document.
For TLS it is important to note that the focus of these efforts It is important to note that the TLS Working Group is focusing its
within the TLS WG is TLS 1.3 or later, and that TLS 1.2 will not be efforts on TLS 1.3 or later; TLS 1.2 will not be supported (see
supported (see [TLS12FROZEN]). This is one more reason for new [TLS12FROZEN]). This is one more reason for new protocols to require
protocols require TLS to default to TLS 1.3, where PQC is actively TLS to default to TLS 1.3, where PQC is actively being standardized,
being standardized, as this gives new applications the option to use as this gives new applications the option to use PQC.
PQC.
4. TLS Use by Other Protocols and Applications 4. TLS Use by Other Protocols and Applications
Any new protocol that uses TLS MUST specify as its default TLS 1.3. Any new protocol that uses TLS MUST specify TLS 1.3 as its default.
For example, QUIC [QUICTLS] requires TLS 1.3 and specifies that For example, QUIC [QUICTLS] requires TLS 1.3 and specifies that
endpoints MUST terminate the connection if an older version is used. endpoints MUST terminate the connection if an older version is used.
If deployment considerations are a concern, the protocol MAY specify If deployment considerations are a concern, the protocol MAY specify
TLS 1.2 as an additional, non-default option. As a counter example, TLS 1.2 as an additional, non-default option. As a counter example,
the Usage Profile for DNS over TLS [DNSTLS] specifies TLS 1.2 as the the Usage Profile for DNS over TLS [DNSTLS] specifies TLS 1.2 as the
default, while also allowing TLS 1.3. For newer specifications that default, while also allowing TLS 1.3. For newer specifications that
choose to support TLS 1.2, those preferences are to be reversed. choose to support TLS 1.2, those preferences are to be reversed.
The initial TLS handshake allows a client to specify which versions The initial TLS handshake allows a client to specify which versions
of the TLS protocol it supports and the server is intended to pick of TLS it supports, and the server is intended to pick the highest
the highest version that it also supports. This is known as the "TLS version that it also supports. This is known as "TLS version
version negotiation," and protocol and negotiation details are negotiation"; protocol and negotiation details are discussed in
discussed in [TLS13], Section 4.2.1 and [TLS12], Appendix E. Many Section 4.2.1 of [TLS13] and Appendix E of [TLS12]. Many TLS
TLS libraries provide a way for applications to specify the range of libraries provide a way for applications to specify the range of
versions they want, including an open interval where only the lowest versions they want, including an open interval where only the lowest
or highest version is specified. or highest version is specified.
If the application is using a TLS implementation that supports this, If the application is using a TLS implementation that supports TLS
and if it knows that the TLS implementation will use the highest version negotiation and if it knows that the TLS implementation will
version supported, then clients SHOULD specify just the minimum use the highest version supported, then clients SHOULD specify just
version they want. This MUST be TLS 1.3 or TLS 1.2, depending on the the minimum version they want. This MUST be TLS 1.3 or TLS 1.2,
circumstances described in the above paragraphs. depending on the circumstances described in the above paragraphs.
5. Changes to RFC 9325 5. Changes to RFC 9325
[RFC9325] provides recommendations for ensuring the security of [RFC9325] provides recommendations for ensuring the security of
deployed services that use TLS and, unlike this document, DTLS as deployed services that use TLS and, unlike this document, DTLS as
well. At the time it was published, it described availability of TLS well. [RFC9325] describes TLS 1.3 as "widely available", and the
1.3 as "widely available." The transition and adoption mentioned in transition to TLS 1.3 has further increased since publication of that
that document has grown, and this document now makes two changes to document. This document thus makes two changes to the
the recommendations in [RFC9325], Section 3.1.1: recommendations in Section 3.1.1 of [RFC9325]:
* That section says that TLS 1.3 SHOULD be supported; this document * That section says that TLS 1.3 SHOULD be supported; this document
mandates that TLS 1.3 MUST be supported for new TLS-using mandates that TLS 1.3 MUST be supported for new protocols using
protocols. TLS.
* That section says that TLS 1.2 MUST be supported; this document * That section says that TLS 1.2 MUST be supported; this document
says that TLS 1.2 MAY be supported as described above. says that TLS 1.2 MAY be supported as described above.
Again, these changes only apply to TLS, and not DTLS. Again, these changes only apply to TLS, and not DTLS.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
TLS 1.2 was specified with several cryptographic primitives and TLS 1.2 was specified with several cryptographic primitives and
design choices that have, over time, become significantly weaker. design choices that have, over time, become significantly weaker.
The purpose of this section is to briefly survey several such The purpose of this section is to briefly survey several such
prominent problems that have affected the protocol. It should be prominent problems that have affected the protocol. It should be
noted, however, that TLS 1.2 can be configured securely; it is merely noted, however, that TLS 1.2 can be configured securely; it is merely
much more difficult to configure it securely as opposed to using its much more difficult to configure it securely as opposed to using its
modern successor, TLS 1.3. See [RFC9325] for a more thorough guide modern successor, TLS 1.3. See [RFC9325] for a more thorough guide
on the secure deployment of TLS 1.2. on the secure deployment of TLS 1.2.
Firstly, the TLS 1.2 protocol, without any extensions, is vulnerable First, without any extensions, TLS 1.2 is vulnerable to renegotiation
to renegotiation attacks (see [RENEG1] and [RENEG2]) and the Triple attacks (see [RENEG1] and [RENEG2]) and the Triple Handshake attack
Handshake attack (see [TRIPLESHAKE]). Broadly, these attacks exploit (see [TRIPLESHAKE]). Broadly, these attacks exploit the protocol's
the protocol's support for renegotiation in order to inject a prefix support for renegotiation in order to inject a prefix chosen by the
chosen by the attacker into the plaintext stream. This is usually a attacker into the plaintext stream. This is usually a devastating
devastating threat in practice, that allows e.g. obtaining secret threat in practice (e.g., it allows an attacker to obtain secret
cookies in a web setting. In light of the above problems, [RFC5746] cookies in a web setting). In light of the above problems, [RFC5746]
specifies an extension that prevents this category of attacks. To specifies an extension that prevents this category of attacks. To
securely deploy TLS 1.2, either renegotiation must be disabled securely deploy TLS 1.2, either renegotiation must be disabled
entirely, or this extension must be used. Additionally, clients must entirely, or this extension must be used. Additionally, clients must
not allow servers to renegotiate the certificate during a connection. not allow servers to renegotiate the certificate during a connection.
Secondly, the original key exchange methods specified for the Second, the original key exchange methods specified for TLS 1.2,
protocol, namely RSA key exchange and finite field Diffie-Hellman, namely RSA key exchange and finite field Diffie-Hellman, suffer from
suffer from several weaknesses. Similarly, to securely deploy the several weaknesses. To securely deploy the protocol, most of these
protocol, most of these key exchange methods must be disabled. See key exchange methods must be disabled. See [KEY-EXCHANGE] for
[I-D.ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex] for details. details.
Thirdly, symmetric ciphers which were widely-used in the protocol, Third, symmetric ciphers that are widely used in TLS 1.2, namely RC4
namely RC4 and CBC cipher suites, suffer from several weaknesses. and Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) cipher suites, suffer from several
RC4 suffers from exploitable biases in its key stream; see [RFC7465]. weaknesses. RC4 suffers from exploitable biases in its key stream;
CBC cipher suites have been a source of vulnerabilities throughout see [RFC7465]. CBC cipher suites have been a source of
the years. A straightforward implementation of these cipher suites vulnerabilities throughout the years. A straightforward
inherently suffers from the Lucky13 timing attack [LUCKY13]. The implementation of these cipher suites inherently suffers from the
first attempt to implement the cipher suites in constant time Lucky13 timing attack [LUCKY13]. The first attempt to implement the
introduced an even more severe vulnerability [LUCKY13FIX]. There cipher suites in constant time introduced an even more severe
have been further similar vulnerabilities throughout the years vulnerability [LUCKY13FIX]. Refer to [CBCSCANNING] for another
exploiting CBC cipher suites; refer to, e.g., [CBCSCANNING] for an example of a vulnerability with CBC cipher suites and a survey of
example and a survey of similar works. similar works.
In addition, TLS 1.2 was affected by several other attacks that TLS In addition, TLS 1.2 was affected by several other attacks that TLS
1.3 is immune to: BEAST [BEAST], Logjam [WEAKDH], FREAK [FREAK], and 1.3 is immune to: BEAST [BEAST], Logjam [WEAKDH], FREAK [FREAK], and
SLOTH [SLOTH]. SLOTH [SLOTH].
And finally, while application layer traffic is always encrypted, Finally, while application-layer traffic in TLS 1.2 is always
most of the handshake messages are not. Therefore, the privacy encrypted, most of the content of the handshake messages is not.
provided is suboptimal. This is a protocol issue that cannot be Therefore, the privacy provided is suboptimal. This is a protocol
addressed by configuration. issue that cannot be addressed by configuration.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
This document makes no requests to IANA. This document has no IANA actions.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9325] Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati, [RFC9325] Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, November (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, November
2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325>. 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9325>.
[TLS12] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [TLS12] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[TLS12FROZEN] [TLS12FROZEN]
Salz, R. and N. Aviram, "TLS 1.2 is in Feature Freeze", Salz, R. and N. Aviram, "TLS 1.2 is in Feature Freeze",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-tls12- RFC 9851, DOI 10.17487/RFC9851, January 2026,
frozen-08, 3 April 2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9851>.
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
tls12-frozen-08>.
[TLS13] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [TLS13] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- Version 1.3", RFC 9846, DOI 10.17487/RFC9846, January
ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-12, 17 February 2025, 2026, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9846>.
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
rfc8446bis-12>.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[BEAST] Duong, T. and J. Rizzo, "Here come the xor ninjas", n.d., [BEAST] Duong, T. and J. Rizzo, "Here Come the XOR Ninjas", May
<http://www.hpcc.ecs.soton.ac.uk/dan/talks/bullrun/ 2011, <http://www.hpcc.ecs.soton.ac.uk/dan/talks/bullrun/
Beast.pdf>. Beast.pdf>.
[CBCSCANNING] [CBCSCANNING]
Merget, R., Somorovsky, J., Aviram, N., Young, C., Merget, R., Somorovsky, J., Aviram, N., Young, C.,
Fliegenschmidt, J., Schwenk, J., and Y. Shavitt, "Scalable Fliegenschmidt, J., Schwenk, J., and Y. Shavitt, "Scalable
Scanning and Automatic Classification of TLS Padding Scanning and Automatic Classification of TLS Padding
Oracle Vulnerabilities", n.d., Oracle Vulnerabilities", 28th USENIX Security Symposium
(USENIX Security 19), August 2019,
<https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec19-merget.pdf>. <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec19-merget.pdf>.
[DNSTLS] Dickinson, S., Gillmor, D., and T. Reddy, "Usage Profiles [DNSTLS] Dickinson, S., Gillmor, D., and T. Reddy, "Usage Profiles
for DNS over TLS and DNS over DTLS", RFC 8310, for DNS over TLS and DNS over DTLS", RFC 8310,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8310, March 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8310, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8310>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8310>.
[FREAK] Beurdouche, B., Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., [FREAK] Beurdouche, B., Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A.,
Fournet, C., Kohlweiss, M., Pironti, A., Strub, P.-Y., and Fournet, C., Kohlweiss, M., Pironti, A., Strub, P.-Y., and
J. K. Zinzindohoue, "A messy state of the union: Taming J. K. Zinzindohoue, "A Messy State of the Union: Taming
the composite state machines of TLS", n.d., the Composite State Machines of TLS", IEEE Symposium on
Security & Privacy 2015, HAL ID: hal-01114250, May 2015,
<https://inria.hal.science/hal-01114250/file/messy-state- <https://inria.hal.science/hal-01114250/file/messy-state-
of-the-union-oakland15.pdf>. of-the-union-oakland15.pdf>.
[I-D.ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers] [KEY-EXCHANGE]
Banerjee, A., Reddy.K, T., Schoinianakis, D., Hollebeek, Aviram, N., "Deprecating Obsolete Key Exchange Methods in
T., and M. Ounsworth, "Post-Quantum Cryptography for (D)TLS 1.2", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
Engineers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex-07, 13 November 2025,
pquip-pqc-engineers-09, 13 February 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-pquip- deprecate-obsolete-kex-07>.
pqc-engineers-09>.
[I-D.ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex]
Bartle, C. and N. Aviram, "Deprecating Obsolete Key
Exchange Methods in TLS 1.2", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex-05, 3
September 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex-05>.
[LUCKY13] Al Fardan, N. J. and K. G. Paterson, "Lucky Thirteen: [LUCKY13] Al Fardan, N. J. and K. G. Paterson, "Lucky Thirteen:
Breaking the TLS and DTLS record protocols", n.d., Breaking the TLS and DTLS record protocols", February
<http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/TLStiming.pdf>. 2013, <http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/TLStiming.pdf>.
[LUCKY13FIX] [LUCKY13FIX]
Somorovsky, J., "Systematic fuzzing and testing of TLS Somorovsky, J., "Systematic Fuzzing and Testing of TLS
libraries", n.d., <https://nds.rub.de/media/nds/ Libraries", CCS '16: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp.
1492-1504, DOI 10.1145/2976749.2978411, October 2016,
<https://nds.rub.de/media/nds/
veroeffentlichungen/2016/10/19/tls-attacker-ccs16.pdf>. veroeffentlichungen/2016/10/19/tls-attacker-ccs16.pdf>.
[PQC] "What Is Post-Quantum Cryptography?", August 2024, [PQC] NIST, "What Is Post-Quantum Cryptography?", June 2025,
<https://www.nist.gov/cybersecurity/what-post-quantum- <https://www.nist.gov/cybersecurity/what-post-quantum-
cryptography>. cryptography>.
[PQC-FOR-ENGINEERS]
Banerjee, A., Reddy, T., Schoinianakis, D., Hollebeek, T.,
and M. Ounsworth, "Post-Quantum Cryptography for
Engineers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
pquip-pqc-engineers-14, 25 August 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-pquip-
pqc-engineers-14>.
[QUICTLS] Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed., "Using TLS to Secure [QUICTLS] Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed., "Using TLS to Secure
QUIC", RFC 9001, DOI 10.17487/RFC9001, May 2021, QUIC", RFC 9001, DOI 10.17487/RFC9001, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9001>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9001>.
[RENEG1] Rescorla, E., "Understanding the TLS Renegotiation [RENEG1] Rescorla, E., "Understanding the TLS Renegotiation
Attack", n.d., Attack", Wayback Machine archive, 5 November 2009,
<https://web.archive.org/web/20091231034700/ <https://web.archive.org/web/20091231034700/
http://www.educatedguesswork.org/2009/11/ http://www.educatedguesswork.org/2009/11/
understanding_the_tls_renegoti.html>. understanding_the_tls_renegoti.html>.
[RENEG2] Ray, M., "Authentication Gap in TLS Renegotiation", n.d., [RENEG2] Ray, M., "Authentication Gap in TLS Renegotiation",
Wayback Machine archive,
<https://web.archive.org/web/20091228061844/ <https://web.archive.org/web/20091228061844/
http://extendedsubset.com/?p=8>. http://extendedsubset.com/?p=8>.
[RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov, [RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
Extension", RFC 5746, DOI 10.17487/RFC5746, February 2010, Extension", RFC 5746, DOI 10.17487/RFC5746, February 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5746>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5746>.
[RFC7465] Popov, A., "Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites", RFC 7465, [RFC7465] Popov, A., "Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites", RFC 7465,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7465, February 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7465, February 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7465>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7465>.
[SLOTH] Bhargavan, K. and G. Leurent, "Transcript collision [SLOTH] Bhargavan, K. and G. Leurent, "Transcript Collision
attacks: Breaking authentication in TLS, IKE, and SSH", Attacks: Breaking Authentication in TLS, IKE, and SSH",
n.d., <https://inria.hal.science/hal-01244855/file/ Network and Distributed System Security Symposium - NDSS
SLOTH_NDSS16.pdf>. 2016, DOI 10.14722/ndss.2016.23418, HAL ID: hal-01244855,
February 2016, <https://inria.hal.science/hal-
01244855/file/SLOTH_NDSS16.pdf>.
[TRIPLESHAKE] [TRIPLESHAKE]
"Triple Handshakes Considered Harmful Breaking and Fixing "Triple Handshakes Considered Harmful: Breaking and Fixing
Authentication over TLS", n.d., Authentication over TLS", Wayback Machine archive,
<https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE>. <https://web.archive.org/web/20250804151857/
https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE>.
[WEAKDH] Adrian, D., Bhargavan, K., Durumeric, Z., Gaudry, P., [WEAKDH] Adrian, D., Bhargavan, K., Durumeric, Z., Gaudry, P.,
Green, M., Halderman, J. A., Heninger, N., Springall, D., Green, M., Halderman, J. A., Heninger, N., Springall, D.,
Thomé, E., Valenta, L., and B. VanderSloot, "Imperfect Thome, E., Valenta, L., VanderSloot, B., Wustrow, E.,
forward secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman fails in practice", Zanella-Beguelin, S., and P. Zimmerman, "Imperfect Forward
n.d., Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice", CCS '15:
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, pp. 5-17,
DOI 10.1145/2810103.2813707, October 2015,
<https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2810103.2813707>. <https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2810103.2813707>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Rich Salz Rich Salz
Akamai Technologies Akamai Technologies
Email: rsalz@akamai.com Email: rsalz@akamai.com
Nimrod Aviram Nimrod Aviram
Email: nimrod.aviram@gmail.com Email: nimrod.aviram@gmail.com
 End of changes. 51 change blocks. 
178 lines changed or deleted 168 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.48.